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LatCrit Theory and the Post-Identity Era:
Transcending the Legacies of Color and
Coalescing a Politics of Consciousness
Mary Coombs*
As others have done, I provide a context for my remarks by
placing myself autobiographically. Those facts about me that seem
relevant here are complex and multiple. For example, I am in both
the dominant position of being tenured and simultaneously a "biased
radical feminist," a combination that occasionally allows one to
undermine the dominance hierarchies at the margin. Autobiography
is at least in part a matter of locating oneself within and around a set
of preexisting identity categories. In that regard, I begin with
Jerome Culp's reminder that there are two different, although not
wholly distinct, aspects of identity - as others see us and as we
construct ourselves. As others see me, I am fairly obviously white,
and, at least here, equally obviously not Latina. One example of the
power of context is that in Miami, where much of the population is
Latino and many of them are blue-eyed and blond, strangers not
infrequently think I am Latina and begin speaking to me in rapid
Cuban-Spanish. Unfortunately for me, I am neither Latina nor
fluent in Spanish -- two only imperfectly related categories -- and
can only respond apologetically, "no hablo Espafiol." Whatever the
frustrations of its politics, Miami is culturally a wonderfully rich,
complex, confusing town, in which I can be mistaken for Latina
while Frank Valdes has been mistaken for Anglo in a Cuban coffee
shop. Qui6n sabe?
As for my background and family history, i.e., my self-identity,
to the best of my knowledge I am also neither Black nor Latina.
* Professor of Law, University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan.
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One focal point of the discussion here has been the complex
relationship between those perceptions of our own identity and the
identity of others, crosscut with questions of the appropriate sources
for identity categories: race, ethnicity, language, and also political
definitions. As Juan Perea, Ian Haney L6pez and Berta HernAndez-
Truyol have pointed out, one of the key contributions LatCrit can
make to the larger progressive politics of identity is its
problematization of the black/white continuum and thus of race
itself. When we see the multiple aspects that help construct
Latino/a identity, it becomes impossible to have a simplistic view of
Black identity or white identity. LatCrit serves not only as an
analogy, but as a complication of racial identity as well, for one can
construct Latino both as a third option (Black or white or Latino)
and as a crosscutting category (Black and Latino or white and
Latino).-
One example may clarify the complexities. In Miami a few
years ago, they nominated a man for one of the many citizen boards
to which city commissioners appoint people. Ordinarily the process
is uncontroversial or handled through backdoor negotiations among
the commissioners. This one, however, erupted into the headlines.
The commission has always been ethnically split; Hispanics were in
the process of replacing Anglos as the dominant political force,
while Blacks remained at the bottom. Miller Dawkins, who was
then the "Black" city commissioner, objected to the appointment
because the man would take what he understood to be the "Black"
seat on that particular board. The potential appointee was far darker
in skin color than Dawkins himself, but he was also Costa Rican.
Dawkins understood the seat to be quite literally African-American.
It required a genealogical link to the historical oppression of Blacks
in the United States. The appointment of what appeared to be a
Black Hispanic would reflect a shift in the balance of power that
Dawkins resisted. Because the appointee was Hispanic, he could
not be Black. But how then would he consider a Jamaican or
Haitian Black?. They are almost surely no more Hispanic than I am.
Yet on the criteria applied by Dawkins, they are not African-
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American either. What becomes increasingly clear is that the
multiple bases of identity and the contextuality and politics of
determining their salience is as true for Blacks and whites as for
Latinos/as. The historical power of the black/white continuum,
however, has obscured that complexity and, in particular, the
political aspects of racialized identities.
The politics of identity is a theme that has been implicit
throughout this conference. I want to highlight it a little, because
it raises the question of the role of an intellectual-political vanguard;
what Gramsci calls organic intellectuals,' such as the group gathered
in this room. The question is what the relationship is - or
relationships are -- between that group and the larger group with
whom they are organically related. The problem I want to raise --
another aspect of the complexity of identity -- is the disjunction
between the two groups.
The issue is particularly apparent if we think about its
concretization in language. Across many categories of identity -
race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation -- we have different
words for, on the one hand, the group that shares the ascribed
characteristic and, on the other, the group of people who
consciously inhabit and explore that identity. The clearest example
is "woman!' and "feminist." In other categories, as we develop new
terms to reflect a more politically conscious identity, older language
takes on a more conservative, less politicized connotation. Consider
the shifts from Negro to Black and, though less clearly at this point,
from Black to African-American. Likewise, the word homosexual
is used as an ascriptive term to describe a category of people who
have a particular sexual orientation; the terms gay or lesbian suggest
a more conscious assuming of an identity and the term queer is still
more consciously political. The distinctions are apparent if one
considers "outing." One could perhaps be outed as a homosexual.
1 See Margaret E. Montoya, Academic Mestizaje: Re/Producing Clinical
Teaching and Re/Framing Wills as Latina Praxis, 2 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 349,
367 (1997).
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It is conceptually impossible, however, to imagine outing someone
as queer. If one is closeted, one simply is not queer.
Finally, my sense is that the terms Hispanic and Latino have a
similar relationship. People in this room would think of themselves
as Latino/Latina. Many of my Cuban students - Who would be
appalled (regardless of their skin tone) at being considered people
of color - would self-identify as Cubano/Cubana or, perhaps, as
Hispanic. Yet, as Jerome Culp would no doubt remind us, the
refusal of the name does not save them from the nativist fervor of
those for whom, whether Hispanic or Latino/a, they are all simply
foreigners to the Anglo body of America.
The relationship between the two categories is complex.
Consider some of the distinctions between those who are members
of a category by ascription and those for whom it is (also) a
category of conscious choice. The latter experience their
membership as at least partly chosen. They feel it as more salient;
for example, they are more likely to mention it and mention it
sooner if asked to talk about "who you are." They are likely to
experience it as a far more pervasive aspect of their identity and as
relevant to far more of the other aspects of their lives, from the
culture to which they feel they belong, to the boundaries of their
sense of family, to the foods that feel like home, to the issues upon
which their politics turn. They are more likely to view others'
membership or nonmembership in that identity category as
significant when choosing life partners or political leaders. Thus,
for example, one could predict that a person who identified as
Latino rather than Hispanic might be more likely to vote for the
Spanish-surnamed Morales for Texas Senator and against Prop. 187
in California. Obviously, all this is complex and more accurately
viewed as arrayed along a continuum - or series of continua - but
the dichotomous language of women and feminists or homosexuals
and queers, used with caution, reminds us of real differences.
Those of us who self-identify as queer, as feminists, as LatCrits,
are different in some way from the larger group. We are, in a
sense, vanguards. We think most and care most passionately about
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the social, cultural and political well-being of the group. Such
people tend to be the leaders of identity-inflected groups, both
political and, as with this conference, academic. If we were simply
like the larger group that identifies with - or is identified with - the
corresponding demographic group, only more intensely so, that
leadership would be unproblematic. But we are not. As Shane
Phelan argues, identity is in part the result of political actions? As
we think about and act on our understanding of what it means to be,
for example, queer, our sense of our own queerness changes. Our
assessment of the interests of the group and the salience of those
interests is sometimes quite distinct from that of people who are
"merely" homosexual. In effect, organic intellectuals grow, in part,
in a different soil.
This disjuncture inevitably raises questions of both authenticity
and representation. Sometimes, we feel obliged to decide who is a
legitimate member of the underlying community. Twila Perry says,
for example, that
any claim to black authenticity - beyond being the potential
object of racist abuse and heir to a grand tradition of black
struggle - is contingent on one's political definition of black
interest and one's ethical understanding of how this interest
relates to individuals and communities in and outside black
America. In short, blackness is a political and ethical
construct.3
In effect, Perry asserts that true group identity requires a
commitment to something more than the "ethnic festival" model of
identity. On that view, Clarence Thomas is not merely an oreo, he
2 See SHANE PHELAN, GmrING SPEcIFIc: POSTMODERN LESBIAN POLITICs
(1994).
3 Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of
Discourse and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33, 108
(1993-1994).
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is not Black (or perhaps merely "passing as Black"). Similarly,
Linda Chavez travels under false colors if she claims to speak as a
Latina.
We must also, however, problematize our own often implicit
claims of representational authority. In doing that self-critical work
we can and should draw upon work done in other contexts. The
problem of representational legitimacy is a pervasive and central
problem in the theory of non-direct democracy. Lawyers, like
political leaders, struggle with the question, especially when they
act on behalf of clients who cannot readily or coherently
communicate their own desires, whether that client be a class, a
child, or a corporation. The rich literature of political theory and
of legal ethics are important resources as we consider when and how
we can claim to speak "for" Hispanics or homosexuals or Black
people. Too often, I fear, we either assume away the problem of
our own limited ability to act as representatives or read those who
do not agree with us out of the group. We are not always
sufficiently clear whether we are speaking for the needs of the group
as we have sought to understand them or for the interests of the
group as they understand them. To the extent we do the former but
purport to be doing the latter, we create ethical problems,
epistemological problems and, insofar as our critics raise such
questions, political problems.
I want to end by describing two specific issues that raise for me
these dilemmas of representation and authority, growing out of two
contexts in which I would like to think of myself as in the vanguard.
First, as a woman and a feminist, I believe strongly in choice and
that affects my politics. Yet I have to recognize that when I
applauded Clinton's veto of the late-term abortion bill, I cannot
claim to represent the views of women though I may plausibly claim
that I represent their interests as women in the autonomy to make
their own decisions when confronted with an abortion dilemma.
Even on issues like sexual harassment, on which there is no
arguable moral countervailing interest, not every woman would take
my articulated feminist position. It is too simple to write off the
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supporters of Katie Roiphe as victims of false consciousness. To
do so is to shut my eyes to the hard political work that needs to be
done. If I am to succeed in making my vision of women's needs
and rights politically viable, I must talk to those women, listen to
them, seek to persuade them. and even recognize the possibility of
being persuaded by them.
My sense of myself also encompasses an identity as queer, both
in the traditional non-sexualized sense of the word and in the newer
sense as well. In my personal life, I am "virtually normal,'" which
may simply be an artifact of coming out as lesbian at an age when
one's sexual attractiveness and sex drive are in decline, regardless
of one's orientation. Queer theory's analysis of the pervasiveness
of queer themes in high and popular culture fascinates me
intellectually. But I suspect there are many homosexuals,
particularly those who do not live in centers of gay and lesbian
culture, who want to and for most purposes do live their lives as
"Ozzie and Harry." They do not march in gay pride parades, and
they would not do so even if it were politically safe. They are not
the sort of folks who march in parades at all. They are a little
appalled by the pictures of Dykes on Bikes and the Sisters of
Perpetual Indulgence that are media highlights of Gay Pride
parades. In a word, they do not want to be queer. But the meaning
of queer, like the meaning of gay and lesbian and the meaning of
homosexual, are as contestable as the allocation of individuals
among these categories. If I claim to speak for the 10 percent of the
population that is homosexual, I cannot do that honestly if I am
demanding the enactment of a radical queer agenda.
Focusing directly on politics and refusing the question of
category definition can also sometimes elide the question of
4 See KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFrER: SEX, FEAR AND FEMINISM ON
CAMPUS (1993). Roiphe and her cohorts argue that claims of harm from date
rape, sexual harassment, pornography and other forms of sexual exploitation only
harm women who should instead claim equality on male terms.
5 See ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
HOMOSEXUALITY (1995).
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representation. Queerness in one of its aspects seeks to do so, by
claiming to be not an identity but a place from which to understand
the various forms of sexual subordination and exclusion that operate
in our society. Similarly, "people of color" is a political category
that grows out of but is not identical with the various nonwhite
racial-ethnic identities, whose subordination people of color come
together to understand, oppose and ultimately overthrow. The
LatCrit movement is a vital part of that grouping. The conference
has helped explore where and how LatCrits can form alliances
within and across the various peoples of color movements. It also
has the task, however, of exploring what its relationship will be
with those people who think of themselves as Hispanic, with the
25 % of that population who voted for Prop. 187, with those for
whom a socially conservative Catholic identity is most salient, i.e.,
with those who lack, in general or on specific issues, the
progressive politics that animate this symposium, yet whom others
perceive as Latino.
One means of helping us reach out to such potential allies is by
being contingent and specific in our coalition building. We are
often wise to focus on mid-level rather than grand theory.6 We can
concentrate our analysis and our political work on concrete issues,
such as the failures of the educational system to serve the needs of
Latino youth, so eloquently described by Rene Nufiez, or the
attempts by Congress to deny benefits even to legal immigrants.
We can then use such issues to build alliances with what I might call
non-Latino/Latina Hispanics.
One last point, if I may. I suggested here the importance of
recognizing that being Hispanic, i.e., Spanish surnamed or
genealogically linked to people who lived in Latin America, is not
a prerequisite to being Latino. I also hope that there may be a place
6 See Martha Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Difference: The Future
of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. 25 (1990).
Volume 2, Fall 1997
in the movement for those of us who are not born Latino/Latina.7
If so, I hope that I can develop the empathy, the concern, and the
knowledge to claim such a place.
7 At the conference, Catherine Wells proposed the wonderful term, "Latino-
connected forces" for non-Hispanics who are concerned with the success of
LatCrit and of the larger movement. I hereby adopt it.
